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Introduction
Academics have been writing about uncertainty in public 
administration since the 1950s (Brown, 1978; Lindblom, 
1959), and more recently complexity theory has provided 
tools for learning one’s way through uncertainty (Eppel, 
Turner and Wolf, 2011; Kurtz and Snowden, 2003). 
Uncertainty is different from change. Uncertainty arises 
from change, but it is also an effect of the social interactions 
engaged in by public servants going about their business, and 
of the environment they work in. Research on the way policy 
is practised provides a way to ‘understand how to conceive of 
public policy making in an uncertain world’ (Hajer and Laws, 
in Moran, Rein and Goodin, 2006, p.421). Within this field, 
the pervasiveness of the effects of uncertainty on the daily 
work of policy practitioners appears to have been given less 
attention than it deserves. 
This article aims to stimulate thinking 
about the positive and negative effects of 
uncertainty. It does not purport to have all 
the answers on how to manage uncertain-
ty better; rather, it provides illustrative 
stories from my recent PhD research 
on the interplay between narrative and 
action in the domain of trans-Tasman 
border management. That research 
revealed that the working environment of 
policy officials is anything but stable; that 
uncertainty acts on officials and how they 
practice their work, day to day. 
The fragility of social connections
The sociology of translation (more 
commonly known as actor-network 
theory), which has as its starting point the 
fragility of social connections, provides an 
entry point into the subject of uncertainty. 
To illustrate, Bruno Latour tells a story 
about Shirley Strum’s study of baboons 
(Latour, 2007). Strum observed that 
baboon social relationships were complex, 
held together by agreed behaviours, such 
as grooming. She realised that grooming 
was not just a practical activity to clean the 
fur; it was a part of maintaining positive 
social connections. But she also observed 
that the baboons had to keep doing this 
every day to maintain the stability of those 
connections. In other words, the daily 
performance of those activities bound 
this baboon social group together.
However, unlike baboons, humans 
have been able to stabilise social 
connections through inventing 
mechanisms such as language, and the 
writing down of language; through 
creating processes and being able to 
document them for others to use; through 
building machines and organisations and 
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infrastructures. Importantly, these have 
enabled us to transport ideas from one 
place to another. For example, the idea 
of public sector organisations providing 
advice to ministers and Cabinet has been 
translated into a written account of the 
method, which is transported by way of 
the Cabinet Office Manual. 
Even so, Latour asserts that stabilising 
mechanisms are only temporary and 
will break down over time. We can see 
these breakdowns in the public sector 
all the time: Cave Creek and Pike 
River are extreme examples. However, 
we humans tend to behave as if our 
stabilising mechanisms are permanent, 
and when that stability breaks down 
we treat it as a problem. Bruno Latour 
reminds us that ‘[t]he world is not a solid 
continent of facts sprinkled by a few 
lakes of uncertainties, but a vast ocean of 
uncertainties speckled by a few islands of 
calibrated and stabilized forms’ (Latour, 
2007, p.245).
The following stories from my 
PhD thesis show how uncertainty 
unconsciously affected officials’ actions, 
and highlight its impacts.
Story 1: Cumulative change creating 
uncertainty of purpose
Story 1 tells what happened to a trans-
Tasman Customs senior officials group 
called the High Level Steering Group. 
Created out of a Customs ministerial 
meeting in 2005, this group from 
Australia and New Zealand customs 
administrations, and on four occasions 
including the respective biosecurity 
administrations, met regularly until 2009, 
after which meetings started to tail off. 
In the first few years the group 
was small, and while the meetings and 
work programme had structure, it was 
a light touch, enabling frank exchanges 
between the senior officials. At this time 
the group was co-chaired by two deputy 
chief executives who knew each other 
well. The group’s focus was clear enough, 
its work programme generated results 
and its regular meetings, often with an 
annotated agenda and resulting action 
points, created an impetus for action. For 
example, on more than one occasion a 
trans-Tasman workshop addressing one 
of the action points from the previous 
minutes was held two weeks before the 
next group meeting. 
In the later stages of the group, 
however, the purpose narrative lacked 
clarity. One official observed: 
there were probably some people 
particularly in the High Level 
Steering Group that felt that the 
discussions weren’t as valuable as 
they might have been and that it 
wasn’t clear what the purpose of 
some of the agenda items was. 
(Nicklin, 2015, p.150)
Another raised questions about the 
future of the group, for which no answers 
were forthcoming: 
Australian International1 had an 
action in probably about 2009 to 
review the HLSG in tandem with 
us, and that never really led to 
anything. So ‘what was the role of 
the HLSG, what was the role of the 
two Customs agencies, where did our 
responsibilities lie, what did we want 
out of CEs, what did we want out of 
Ministers?’ (Nicklin, 2015, p.150)
The data indicates that there were 
multiple factors leading to the uncertainty 
of purpose: one of the co-chairs retired, 
thus removing the close personal 
relationship that maintained the impetus 
of the group; the number of attendees at 
the meetings increased as people from 
lower levels in the organisation attended 
to report on their item, resulting in an 
inability to conduct the more intimate 
discussions originally intended; some 
items on the work programme were 
completed or found to be unfeasible, 
resulting in a dropping off of impetus; 
the work emerging from a joint Australia-
New Zealand prime ministerial statement 
on 2 March 2009, in effect overtaking the 
work of the group, which was not strongly 
connected into either organisation’s 
strategic priorities.2 It is evident that the 
group was undergoing constant change, 
and the cumulative effect of that change 
was uncertainty of purpose.
Uncertainty of purpose is familiar 
in the policy world, particularly when 
officials have to translate ambiguous 
directional political statements into 
something actionable. One official 
articulated the difficulty:
often what happens is you have 
that broad political statement, like 
the 2009 statement, and so officials 
get excited, try to come up with 
solutions to match that, and the 
solutions are a bit vague and unclear, 
and therefore in discussion we were 
never really sure between the two 
countries what we were actually 
trying to do. (Nicklin, 2015, p.181)
A common and usually effective 
response to uncertainty of purpose is 
to revisit and rework it, often through 
changing the narrative.3
Story 2: Messy narratives
A key aspect of policy practice is 
uncovering and telling a story (Roe, 
1994). However, more than just being 
told, John Law sees stories as acting on 
us and enabling us to create things: ‘one 
way of imagining the world is that it is 
a set of (pretty disorderly) stories that 
intersect and interfere with one another’ 
(Law, 2000, p.2). He is talking about how 
Uncertainty of purpose is familiar in the 
policy world, particularly when officials 
have to translate ambiguous directional 
political statements into something 
actionable.
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messy the process of doing so often is, 
as different people’s narratives rub up 
against one another. A side-effect of this 
messiness is uncertainty.
Story 2 tells of the uncertainty 
created by narratives that intersected 
and interfered with one another. On 
2 March 2009 the Australian and New 
Zealand prime ministers committed, in 
their usual joint statement issued after 
meeting over the previous two days, to 
‘reduce remaining barriers at the borders 
to ensure that people and goods can move 
more easily between the two countries’ 
(Key and Rudd, 2009a). One initiative 
supported by New Zealand prime 
minister John Key was for New Zealand 
to introduce SmartGate, the automated 
passenger processing technology 
introduced by Australia in 2007 – and 
now in operation at Auckland, Wellington 
and Christchurch international airports. 
Key wanted to see visible change by 
December that year, which made a tight 
time frame for getting Cabinet approval, 
then purchasing and installing the 
equipment. Customs’ main narrative was 
that investing in SmartGate would create 
a common trans-Tasman experience 
for travellers: this was the driver for 
that particular technology choice. To 
them, they were just automating an 
existing process (implication: there’s no 
problem). The other border agencies had 
different concerns. They wanted a good 
investment for government, one that 
could accommodate their longer-term 
needs and that would bring productivity 
and financial benefits. Their narratives 
were different. None was ‘right’ or 
‘wrong’.
The data shows that the process of 
agreeing on the exact narrative that 
accommodated these different matters 
of concern in the Cabinet paper caused 
considerable uncertainty for officials, 
particularly for Customs, who were 
holding the pen. Added pressures on 
officials were the tight time frame and 
Cabinet’s directive to present a paper 
with a single set of recommendations. 
This story highlights the uncertainty 
caused by agencies working together 
without having first sorted out their 
respective organisational narratives. 
My research showed that when officials 
work across agencies they bring to the 
table many different narratives, both 
individually and collectively. Some of 
these narratives are implied rather than 
explicit, and can cause disruptions (and 
therefore uncertainties) later in the 
process if not flushed out. At the start of 
a policy initiative there could be benefit 
from taking more time to unpack the 
matters of concern that officials bring 
into the room, and the narratives that 
sit behind them, to see where those 
narratives contribute to the matter that 
brings people together, and where they 
conflict. This would then clear the way 
for officials to examine the ‘who, what, 
when, where and how’ of the work. 
Story 3: Uncertainty from tight deadlines
Policy practitioners are used to working 
to tight deadlines. Story 3 describes the 
uncertainty from having to work to an 
extreme set of deadlines, and what officials 
did to meet them.
On 12 March 2009, ten days after the 2 
March joint prime ministerial statement, 
the chief executive of the Department of 
the Prime Minister and Cabinet (DPMC) 
tasked New Zealand border agency4 
officials with developing a new trans-
Tasman travel model for consideration 
by Cabinet. The officials were given a 
punishingly short time frame, having to 
produce a report to the chief executive of 
the DPMC in two weeks, and a proposal 
for the Cabinet strategy committee, 
with all its attendant sign-offs by senior 
officials and three border ministers, for 
a meeting five weeks later; a full Cabinet 
paper with proposals agreed by border 
agencies in New Zealand and Australia 
was to be completed six weeks after that. 
The data shows the discomfort officials 
were experiencing at having to document 
how something would work when they 
had not had time to fully check out how 
or whether what they were saying would 
work. For example: 
in an update on the outcome of a 
New Zealand Customs workshop I 
had facilitated,5 I noted ‘... another 
important conclusion was confirming 
that what we are proposing for TT6 
is complex – we won’t really know 
the effect of changing our processes 
so dramatically, so need to be able 
to test our assumptions as we go’. 
(Nicklin, 2015, p.176)
The delivery time frame demanded 
by the DPMC acted on officials in this 
situation, making it impossible for them 
to trial or test any of the ideas beyond 
basic consultation with their operational 
colleagues. At the same time, 
dates were unstable – dates for 
papers to be discussed by Cabinet; 
dates of Ministers’ meetings. In the 
former case, this had a positive effect 
by providing more time to develop 
the required detail; in the latter, it 
removed an opportunity to test New 
Zealand’s thinking with Australia 
at the ministerial level. This would 
have reduced one area of uncertainty. 
(Nicklin, 2015, p.181)
A key mechanism for reducing the 
uncertainty and managing the pressure 
during this period was the border sector 
The delivery time frame demanded 
by the DPMC acted on officials in this 
situation, making it impossible for them 
to trial or test any of the ideas beyond 
basic consultation with their operational 
colleagues.
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secretariat. This small team, whose role 
was to coordinate the collaborative work 
of the border sector agencies, issued a 
timeline of day-by-day actions, organised 
the many multi-agency meetings, 
drafted the papers, and interpreted the 
multiple sources of feedback on those 
drafts, turning them into an agreed final 
product. Tools such as email and a shared 
electronic workspace played important 
roles in transporting the meeting 
invitations, draft and final papers and 
feedback between officials. 
The border secretariat did a lot more 
than just coordinate. Its staff and its 
outputs spoke on behalf of New Zealand 
border agencies and the DPMC, who in 
turn spoke on behalf of the prime minister. 
This created a thick set of connections for 
the border secretariat which helped them 
deliver a new model and a supporting 
Cabinet paper in a very short time frame. 
An effect of these connections, and the 
tight time frames they created, was the 
necessity to bypass a full policy process, 
which would have seen them consulting 
widely on and iterating the design of the 
model before submitting it to Cabinet. 
The stabilising effect of the secretariat 
could be seen as a kind of proxy for the 
effect a full policy process would have had 
in reducing uncertainty, though I suggest 
the full process would have reduced the 
uncertainty more.
This mechanism was disestablished in 
late 2011, when priorities changed and it 
was no longer seen to be needed. It was 
re-established recently as a new need 
emerged, highlighting the temporary 
nature of stabilising mechanisms, and 
reminding us that they need to be 
reviewed periodically for fitness for 
purpose.
Story 4: The uncertainty of the future and 
how to reduce it
On 20 August 2009 the two prime 
ministers issued a second joint prime 
ministerial statement which committed to 
a joint Australia–New Zealand feasibility 
study on a new trans-Tasman travel model 
(Key and Rudd, 2009b). This commitment 
reflected Australia’s desire to start afresh 
because of different stakeholder interests 
in Australia, rather than use New Zealand’s 
model. To make the work manageable, 
officials split it into two phases. Phase one 
was to develop terms of reference which 
set out different options, a wide range of 
considerations and an estimated budget; 
phase two was to develop from one of 
those options a model that provided a 
‘domestic-like experience’. Both phases 
were conducted by the same external 
contractor. 
This work was slower in pace than 
that in Story 3, and the nature of the 
uncertainties was different. The purpose 
of the work was clear enough; the 
time frames were more manageable; 
the narratives of the different agencies 
involved on both sides of the Tasman were 
different but not disruptive.7 Uncertainty 
came from the physical separation of each 
country’s officials, lack of clarity around 
the problem to be solved, and the lack 
of something tangible with which senior 
officials could engage. Unlike SmartGate, 
which was a piece of technology that 
could be seen, touched and used, the 
work on the new model couldn’t be easily 
experienced. 
What officials did unconsciously was 
to step by step make the end goal more 
and more visible. The initial decision to 
maintain existing connections (i.e., travel 
being between two international airports, 
as opposed to options involving domestic 
airports) could be experienced, and so 
was easy to understand. However, how 
the new model would be different, and 
how it would work, was not. So officials 
defined and described the term ‘domestic-
like’, and, as the work developed, created 
a representational diagram supported by 
a detailed description. 
The descriptions and visual iterations 
of the model played an important part in 
creating stabilising points for the work. 
They gave officials something to present 
to senior officials for decision, each 
decision giving officials a stable jumping-
off point for the next stage of detail. The 
diagrams were particularly important in 
providing a picture of the future that was 
communicable to others, with each new 
level of detail making the picture of the 
future more and more tangible. 
These observations highlight that the 
concept of a ‘future state’ is invisible 
until it is revealed, and while it is 
being revealed, it is unstable. At 
the same time, through the policy 
process, each part is stabilised, 
albeit temporarily, as it is revealed. 
(Nicklin, 2015, p.219) 
In doing so they made the future 
goal (the end) less and less uncertain, 
although even seemingly stabilised points 
were sometimes relitigated. Eventually, 
officials had enough detail to be able to 
translate the description of the model 
into a question about the feasibility of 
implementing it: did the cost–benefit 
really stack up? This was the point 
at which the chief executives became 
properly engaged, because it connected 
with their core interests. 
Reflections
Reflecting on these stories, we can 
see some wider implications from 
examining uncertainty. First, the effects 
of uncertainty on officials are part of what 
officials manage every day and manifest 
in multiple ways in their work. They help 
explain why the policy cycle is less a model 
that represents how policy works, and 
more a visual concept that helps provide 
some structure to policy practitioners’ 
thinking. 
Second, these stories reinforce that 
policy practice is an uncertain business, 
not just a changing or a risky business. 
Therefore, the more we can understand 
the effects of uncertainty on officials, and 
There is another side to uncertainty 
– that of an opening up, of creating a 
space for possibility.
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bring to light the ways in which those 
officials effectively counteract or manage 
those effects, the better the outcomes are 
going to be. 
Third, uncertainty doesn’t just affect 
the work; it affects the people carrying it 
out. For example, my research has shown 
how uncertainty can undermine officials’ 
confidence in the advice they are providing; 
how it can create misunderstandings and 
emotions that derail the work; how it can 
result in officials not being clear about 
what they are meant to be delivering or 
why. These are effects that can be, and 
need to be, managed. 
There is another side to uncertainty – 
that of an opening up, of creating a space 
for possibility. For while something is 
uncertain, it is not set, and there is ‘room 
for something different to occur’ (Nicklin, 
2015, p.259). The introduction of service 
design and continuous improvement 
methods into the public service speak to 
this ‘possibility space’ through new ways 
of working, a development worthy of 
further investigation.
Do we need a new way to look at 
uncertainty? Would we get different 
results, for example, if we practiced 
policy with an expectation of uncertainty 
and if we better understood how to 
deal with it; if we appreciated periods 
of stability, rather than expected them? 
These reflections and questions indicate 
that there is value in finding out more 
about how officials can better understand 
and manage the effects of uncertainty.
1 The International section in the Australian Customs and 
Border Protection Service, which looked after the bilateral 
relationship with New Zealand.
2 See Story 2
3 The terms ‘narrative’ and ‘story’ are used interchangeably, 
although stories are often equated with a ‘beginning–middle–
end’, whereas narratives are less so.
4 New Zealand Customs Service, Ministry of Agriculture and 
Forestry, Department of Labour (Immigration New Zealand), 
Department of Internal Affairs and Ministry of Transport. 
Australian border agencies were not involved in this work, 
though they were consulted briefly. 
5 I was very involved in this particular initiative.
6 TT is short for trans-Tasman, referring to the work on the new 
travel model.
7 By comparison, some stakeholders were pushing for their 
own interests. For example, the Tourism and Transport Forum 
Australia wrote two reports – Special Treatment for a Special 
Relationship (August 2013) and Bringing our Neighbour 
Closer (August 2014) (retrieved from http://www.ttf.org.au/
Content/aviation.asp) – and a media article (retrieved from 
http://www.scoop.co.nz/stories/BU0905/S00097.htm).
Disclaimer: The views in this article are 
the author’s own, and do not represent 
the position of the New Zealand Customs 
Service or the New Zealand government. 
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